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Biosecurity and insecurity: 
The interaction between policy and ritual during the foot and mouth crisis 
 
Abstract: 
In 2001 a highly infectious animal disease, foot and mouth disease, broke out in the 
UK and spread rapidly. In May, when the spread seemed to be slowing down, new 
disease hotspots appeared in previously little affected regions, such as North 
Yorkshire. New biosecurity rules were imposed. Based on a series of semi-structured 
interviews with stakeholders, this article shows that the biosecurity measures 
farmers implemented during the epidemic meant more than just reducing the risk of 
spreading FMD. For many, cleansing and disinfecting became Foot and Mouth. 
Biosecurity actions became invested with symbolic values and, in particular, were 
ritualised as part of the symbolic spatial construction of an otherwise „invisible‟ 
enemy.  
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Our fire may be out, but when I looked out of the 
window first thing this morning I could see the 
smoke from three fires drifting down the valley. 
It‟s like the whole world is sick. And Dad is trying 
to wash it away. He‟s out there from dawn to 
dusk working like a madman. Ever since the 
ministry told him that every building on the farm 
has to be cleared out and disinfected, he hasn‟t 
stopped. He‟s out there now – and it‟s nearly nine 
o‟clock at night – cleaning off the rafters in the 
lambing shed. He‟s been at it all day. Mum has 
tried to stop him, to slow him down. But he won‟t 
listen. (Morpurgo 2001: 88-89) 
 
Introduction 
In 2001 Great Britain experienced an outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) of 
unexpected magnitude. The first case was confirmed in pigs in an abattoir in Essex 
on 20 February 2001.1 The possible source of the infection was traced to a small pig 
unit in Northumberland, Burnside Farm, where it is thought that the disease had 
been introduced at the beginning of February through the use of waste meat 
products, probably illegally imported airline food, mixed into pigswill. From then 
onwards the disease spread quickly throughout the UK and affected sheep and cattle 
in particular. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (now 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, DEFRA) made efforts to trace 
the spread of the disease and eliminate it, applying the traditional methods of 
slaughter and livestock movement restrictions (see Woods 2004). However the 
epidemic spread quickly, but unevenly, as summarised in this paragraph from an 
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article written by one of the teams that tried to create mathematical models of the 
spread of the disease:   
 
The F.M.D. epidemic [...] peaked in early April 2001 after two months of rapid 
spread throughout Great Britain [...] in early February. The subsequent decay 
of the epidemic was initially rapid, but then slowed because of significant new 
outbreaks in previously little-affected regions (notably North Yorkshire and 
Lancashire) outside the three major foci in the north (Cumbria, Dumfries and 
Galloway, and Northumberland), the southwest (Devon and Somerset) and 
Welsh borders (Hertfordshire, Worcestershire and Powys). (Ferguson et al. 
2001)  
 
By the end of September the epidemic had abated and in January 2002 the UK 
regained disease-free status. Millions of animals were slaughtered in the process of 
eradicating FMD from Great Britain.  
 During the outbreak the term biosecurity entered the farming vocabulary and 
became a watchword for farmers, a mechanism of control and surveillance and a 
political catchphrase. As one Devon farmer recounted in a diary she kept and 
published during the outbreak: 
 
New words crept into our language and became part of our everyday life. 
Words such as „biosecurity‟, „contiguous cull‟, „slaughter on suspicion, „FMD‟ and 
„C and D‟ [cleansing and disinfection]. (Leaney 2001) 
 
Although farmers soon knew what this new term, biosecurity, meant, for those not 
affected by FMD, the scientific meaning or rationale underpinning the use of 
biosecurity measures remained obscure. One young man, involved in a focus group 
study commissioned by DEFRA said: 
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„Biosecurity‟ – is that where they‟re saying that‟s a farm that has been 
disinfected and cleaned? Being sterile and whatever, possibly. Would the „bio‟ 
be to do with the weather or herds?” (C2DE Males, Young family, Disease Free 
area, Brighton) (DEFRA 2001) 
 
During the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the UK, biosecurity principally referred “to a set 
of simple procedures intended to prevent the coincidental spread of disease through 
normal activities: actions such as washing hands and disinfecting clothes and 
vehicles can contribute to biosecurity. Although it is an internationally recognised 
term, prior to the 2001 FMD epidemic biosecurity was largely unheard of in the 
United Kingdom” (Donaldson and Wood 2004: 373).   
 Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the increased threats of 
bioterrorism in general and agri-bioterrorism in particular, the term has become 
better established in the wider political and media discourse. Inside biological risk 
management procedures concepts like „biosecurity‟ and „biosafety‟ are used in 
conjunction with their equally technical counterpart „biorisks‟. In agriculture, 
„biosecurity‟ is generally defined a set of management practices which, when followed 
collectively, reduce the potential for the introduction or spread of animal disease 
causing organisms onto and between farms (on the various emerging meanings of 
„biosecurity‟ see Biosecurity n.d.; on biosecurity advice given by DEFRA, see DEFRA 
2003).  
 In their article “Surveilling strange materialities”, Donaldson and Wood 
describe how the concept of „biosecurity‟ was popularised in 2001 in the UK: 
 
An information sheet explaining biosecurity and offering advice on this practice 
was posted to livestock farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) on 4 March: the information was also available from the MAFF 
website. Further information was distributed in April and May. A video was 
distributed on 6 July [...] (2004: 383; see also Anderson 2002: 156) 
 6 
 
The advice on biosecurity given by MAFF and later DEFRA was however changing all 
the time during the outbreak, as those managing it were themselves on a steep 
learning curve. For example, the initial precautionary closure of all footpaths was 
later revoked, and the number of hours between visiting an infected premise and 
another farm for vets was cut from 5 days to 24 hours. The inadequacies of 
contingency planning meant that many of those involved, including those drafted into 
staff helplines, had to learn about the disease and about biosecurity on the job2. This 
created a lot of confusion and uncertainty, as this extract from a House of Commons 
debate demonstrates: 
 
His farming constituents, like mine, no doubt suffered during the foot and 
mouth crisis from MAFF's continual changes of instructions on biosecurity 
measures. In those circumstances, how is a farmer expected to know what the 
correct biosecurity measures are? (see Hansard 2001) 
 
In this context, some farmers regarded the release of a biosecurity video in July, four 
months into the outbreak, as rather ironic. One farmer, involved in the interviews in 
North Yorkshire on which this study is based, said for example: 
 
[…] when foot and mouth was nearly finished they brought out a video “Here 
this is how to disinfect.” “Oh, a video.” We‟d nearly finished by then, why didn‟t 
they do it the first week it came out, it didn‟t take a brain surgeon [laughs]. It 
was a good video, if they‟d had that and issued that to farmers “here this is 
what you should be doing,” it was good information you know you sit down, 
you watch it and that‟s it, it‟s the best, everybody has a mobile phone, the 
email, the blooming‟ video recorder, anything in their house and they didn‟t‟ 
use it. No that was, it was a bit useless really. (Peter) 
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Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with farmers such as this one in 
North Yorkshire, this article aims to show that the biosecurity measures farmers 
implemented during the epidemic came to mean more than just reducing the risk of 
spreading FMD. 
 We argue that in 2001 the term „biosecurity‟ functioned in two quite different 
social contexts at the interface between scientifically informed policy and risk 
management on the one hand and social and individual practices on the other. 
Donaldson and Wood (2004) have studied how this jargon term functioned in its 
political context as a means of political surveillance and intimidation. They claim that 
biosecurity “was touted as a banner of good practice for farmers and consequently 
seen by the farming community as a way of shifting the blame for the government‟s 
failings in disease management onto farmers” (2004: 373). Whereas, in some 
instances, biosecurity seems to have been a political tool used to apportion blame, 
farmers, interviewed for this study, were keen to emphasise that their 
implementation of biosecurity measures did not represent tacit acceptance of 
governmental policy. The politicisation of biosecurity in this way has lasting 
consequences and should be of interest to those involved in improving animal health.  
 In this article we want to look beyond political use of biosecurity measures, to 
investigate the multiple practices farmers engaged with that are covered by the 
umbrella term „biosecurity‟, such as the restriction of the movement of animals, 
vehicles and people, washing hands, disinfecting boots and vehicles and avoiding 
contact with animals. As Donaldson and Wood have studied the symbolic values that 
the concept biosecurity assumed in the political sphere, we, by contrast, want to 
explore some of the symbolic values that biosecurity actions were invested with by 
those on the ground. It should, however, be stressed that this distinction between 
the symbolic, political and scientific meanings and uses of biosecurity is an 
idealisation, as all three intermingled in the spheres of science, policy and practice, 
as the following example shows. In April 2001 the then Minister for Agriculture Nick 
Brown was asked “why disinfectant matting cannot be laid on the bridge to provide 
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at least some protection for the farms in south-east Cornwall” and replied: “I am 
advised that the issue of disinfected mats is rather more symbolic than real”; BBC 
News 2001b). 
 
Study design 
This article is based upon a series of in-depth interviews with six farmers, a vet and a 
farmer cum dairy inspector (who also manned helplines) affected by FMD in North 
Yorkshire. Additionally, we used an interview about biosecurity with a DEFRA 
scientist. The interviews were conducted in private homes. Informed consent was 
obtained prior to each interview. All participants agreed to be recorded on audiotape. 
The average length of interviews was an hour and a half. The tapes were transcribed 
verbatim by a trained transcriber. The interviews were carried out in April 2004, that 
is, three years after the crisis. However, we found that memories of the events were 
still very vivid for all participants. For some, time had just blunted pervasive feelings 
of horror and sadness enough to actually be able to talk about events with people 
outside the farming community. The following diagram provides an overview of the 
various situations in which the farming participants1 found themselves during the 
outbreak: 
 
                                           
1 The selection of participants was not systematically designed to cover both male 
and female participants; it was rather accomplished by „word of mouth‟.  
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We chose North Yorkshire for this study, as some of the biosecurity experiences of 
farmers there were quite distinctive. The most notable features of the North 
Yorkshire outbreak were the following: FMD broke out in North Yorkshire very late in 
the course of the disease spread (when in some other parts of the country, but not 
Cumbria, recovery had slowly begun2, when the general election, postponed at the 
height of the crisis, was over and the population at large thought the outbreak was 
„under control‟; see Hetherington 2001)3; biosecurity measures were vastly 
intensified to stop the spread of this late outbreak and they were more rigorously 
policed inside newly created „blue box zones‟ (see Anderson 2002)4; one reason for 
this biosecurity clampdown was that there was a high risk of FMD spreading south to 
pig breeding areas which were regarded as potential “virus factories” because of 
intensive farming (Hetherington 2001); and, finally, the official cleansing policy of 
                                           
2 It should be stressed however that recovery everywhere was very slow. The fear of 
FMD returning stayed with the farming community for a very long time and with it 
the stress associated with keeping the virus at bay. 
Interviewers 
name 
Interviewee’s 
name 
(pseudonym) 
Gender Occupation Place of 
interview 
Situation in 
FMD outbreak 
Nick Wright Ben M Vet North Yorkshire Worked in 
local practice. 
Bulk of work 
involved 
inspections for 
movement 
licenses 
Nick Wright Harry II M Arable & 
suckler heard 
North Yorkshire Infected and 
slaughtered 
Nick Wright Peter M Arable, dairy & 
beef 
North Yorkshire Slaughtered in 
contiguous cull 
Nick Wright Henry M Beef & suckler 
heard 
North Yorkshire Farm survived 
slaughter: just 
outside area of 
contiguous cull 
Nick Wright John, Nancy & 
David 
M, F & 
M 
Arable, sheep 
and cattle 
North Yorkshire Infected and 
slaughtered. 
Nick Wright Ned M Dairy Hygiene 
Inspector with 
Food 
Standards 
Agency & 
farmer 
North Yorkshire Manned 
telephone 
helpline for 
North West 
Nick Wright Pat M Arable & cattle North Yorkshire Initial 
diagnosis 
proved 
unfounded. 
Not 
slaughtered 
Nick Wright Paul M Beef & sheep North Yorkshire Affected 
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farms after slaughter was halted and reviewed just when North Yorkshire 
experienced its first major outbreak of FMD in July 2001 (see BBC News 2001a). This 
added to the general “confusion” surrounding the official disease control policy. 
Uncertainty and insecurity were central features of living with the threat and 
then the arrival of FMD in North Yorkshire, as stressed in the following extract from 
an official document. Margaret Wood, a Health Visitor at Pickering Surgery, North 
Yorkshire, wrote a leaflet in which she wanted to raise awareness of issues 
surrounding the stress caused by FMD and its handling in the rural communities she 
dealt with. She wrote: “Client and community concerns centred around lack of 
knowledge about FMD, concerns for future livelihood and the stresses of trying to 
work with ever changing uncertainties. The biggest concern which embraced all 
others was uncertainty.” (Wood 2002; see also Mort et al. 2005)  
In the following we will analyse the narratives told by the participants in our 
study of how they reconciled feelings of insecurity with increasing pressure on 
biosecurity. The results that emerge from this small interview study carried out in 
North Yorkshire are culturally and historically specific. Further empirical investigation 
at different times and in different places is needed to establish the extent to which 
the results from this study can be generalised. However, the results of our study tally 
with research carried out in a large-scale empirical investigation of the socio-
psychological impact of FMD in Cumbria (see Mort et al., 2005). 
 
Aims and objectives 
One of the central aims of the ESRC project on which this article is based3 was to 
explore how „lay‟ knowledge of the disease is framed and structured. In particular we 
set out to analyse images and narratives used by farmers and other stakeholders to 
construct events and explanations of the outbreak. In the course of interviewing 
farmers, vets, valuers, scientists, policy makers, journalists and activists for this 
                                           
3 ESRC Science in Society programme grant: Caught between Science and Society: 
Foot and mouth disease, March 2003-February 2005. 
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wider study4, it became clear that biosecurity measures were not only implemented 
to reduce the risk of infection; instead cleansing and disinfecting became Foot and 
Mouth. In recalling events, actions were ritualised as part of the symbolic spatial 
construction of an otherwise „invisible‟ enemy. Measures designed and promoted with 
the aim of reducing the risk of spread, formed a focus around which the epidemic 
was narrated in terms of personal strategies of coping, of reducing guilt and or 
deflecting blame from others, rather than a story framed by science, risk or trust in 
nationally orchestrated biosecurity strategies.  
  
Narrative structure 
The analysis draws on the tradition of the biographic-interpretative method. As 
Wengraf (2000) explains: 
 
We analyse the „lived life‟ to understand the sequence of the non-
controversial „objective‟ life events of the person in their historical 
context; the „told story‟ to understand the structure and the modality of 
the narrative account, the significance of the way the story is told. (p. 
117) 
 
Our account tends towards the latter (but not exclusively so), as we treat accounts 
as texts which enable us to explore the frameworks around which people construct 
explanations for and accounts of events. We use the word „construct‟ deliberately, as 
we analyse post hoc narratives about events that happened three years before the 
interviews, narratives that will probably have been repeated, rehearsed and 
reconstructed during the time that separates action from narration. As Bailey et al. 
(2003) pointed out: 
 
                                           
4 Overall 40 interviews were carried out. 
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[…] a narrative offers a translation of a perception of events, presenting cause 
and effect in a selective manner, which makes sense to the author. From our 
experience and the work of others […] we know that narratives rarely simply 
'reveal' what someone thinks or feels, any „truth‟ is a construction. […] a sense 
of a beginning, middle and end, a linear and ordered telling of a tale is a 
storyteller‟s way of creating order out of a flow of experiences in order make 
sense of actions and events […] (Bailey et al. 2003: 42) 
 
When analysing the participants‟ narratives three phases emerged from the data, 
phases that had distinctive emotional characteristics and during which individual 
coping strategies were used to deal with emotional stress, uncertainties and practical 
problems that arose from waiting for FMD to arrive and dealing with its arrival. These 
phases were: waiting for FMD (a phase that had two sub-phases: waiting to see 
whether FMD would reach North Yorkshire and waiting for FMD to reach the 
individual farm); contracting FMD (where one can distinguish between three sub-
phases: waiting for the slaughter to begin, the slaughter phase itself and the removal 
of the carcasses) and the phase following the cull (where one can distinguish 
between the cleaning phase and the recovery phase – in North Yorkshire the cleaning 
phase was interrupted and therefore much prolonged, well into the winter of 2001). 
During phases one and three, keeping the farm “spotless” was regarded as all-
important, for emotional reasons (having “peace of mind”), as well as practical ones 
(complying with biosecurity policy, avoiding prosecution and preparing for 
restocking).  
   In the following, we study the participants‟ narratives about how they dealt 
with various aspects of what later came to be known as biosecurity roughly following 
the chronological ordering identified above. 
 
Before Biosecurity 
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Using disinfectant and restricting access are discussed in retrospective as intuitive or 
„common-sense‟. Little reference is made to the science on which this is based, its 
just „one of those things we all know‟. Underpinning this, even though the word „risk‟ 
was almost never used in our interviews, personal risk assessments happened within 
which biosecurity measures (again without the use of that term) taken were fitted 
and risks evaluated accordingly: 
 
We were trying to be as clean and squeaky clean as we could. As soon as the 
outbreak was confirmed we virtually, well we didn‟t block the road off down 
here but where you come over the cattle grid there we‟d got disinfectant points 
there, and of our places that you went on were disinfected. […] so as the 
outbreak broke out we actually blocked that off and then rang the Highways 
Departments and said we‟d blocked it off. (John, Nancy and David) 
 
Keeping things “spotless” (a word used numerous times in the interviews) and 
keeping things out of the farm gave expression to and were a physical manifestation 
of personal disease management strategies. These constructions can, however, have 
negative consequences, as the following example recounted by a DEFRA scientist 
illustrates. There was a farmer who, before entering his field, had disinfected his 
vehicle with great care. His animals had shown no sign of disease and so he had 
driven off. Later on it was shown that his animals had been infected (although at the 
time they had shown no clinical signs), and that it was likely that FMD had been 
passed to his neighbour on his vehicle. Cleansing on departure from the field and not 
only when entering it would have reduced that risk. The scientist recounted this story 
to make the point that although the farmer thought of the measures he had taken in 
terms of keeping disease out, this is a misnomer in that many of the measures are 
designed to stop the disease spreading. Personal risk assessments embedded in 
narratives not only formed post-hoc rationalisations, but affected implementation of 
biosecurity measures at the time.  
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 A Trading Standards Officer interviewed pointed out that the risk of walkers 
spreading FMD disease was small (see also Cumbria Foot & Mouth Inquiry 2002); 
however there was reluctance to remove “No entry signs” on footpaths as the 
epidemic waned or to subsequently agree to keep the countryside „open‟ except in 
infected areas should there ever be another outbreak.   
 We are not suggesting ideas of exclusion and cleanliness which combine in the 
risk assessments outlined above were exclusive to farmers; the idea of „shutting the 
countryside‟ as a precautionary measure initially found support within central and 
local government, and, indeed, the public voluntarily stayed away from the 
countryside in their droves. The appeal of this strategy lay in the way it chimed in 
with cognitive „common-sense‟ accounts, some of them rooted in abiding memories 
of the last outbreak of FMD in 1967, of attempts to keep the disease out and anxiety 
at bay.   
 
Virtual FMD 
Biosecurity was not only talked about as a practical necessity, but as a mental and 
emotional matter. It was discussed as something of a state of mind (see Potter and 
Wetherell 1987). Each stage was discussed in terms of coping strategies 
accompanied by characteristic emotions. During the first phase, when farmers were 
still uncertain whether FMD would come to North Yorkshire or later to their own farm, 
they described being under enormous emotional stress. As the following quote 
shows, emotions are intimately linked up with the biosecurity narratives of „keeping 
the disease out‟ and „keeping the farm clean‟: 
 
You thought well if we can just keep it out of the farm for that month, if we can 
just keep it out then it will all be all right and we can get on.  You felt as though 
this weight was on your shoulders, this pressure of not knowing of where it is 
and how we‟re going to cope if we got it and what to do to keep it out.  And 
you tried your best to keep it out with disinfection at the, what we call the top 
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gate, the farm gate on the drive. As you‟ve seen it‟s a concrete road, we kept it 
spotlessly clean (right). 
I don‟t know what the emotions were it was, it was fear, it was anxiety, I don‟t 
know I can‟t explain it (mm). It was horrible I know that much it was just 
horrible. (Peter) 
 
Descriptions of keeping biosecurity up paint a picture of personal anguish and of 
living under threat. “Anxiety”, “fear”, “worry” “anger” and “rage”, which alternated 
with hope that FMD would pass the county by, were characterised as emotionally 
exhausting (“the waiting was the worst”). Participants began their accounts of FMD 
by highlighting an anxiety phase, when FMD was still virtual. This found expression in 
utterances such as: 
 
Well when it first came on the news I suppose as with everything that comes 
on the news, some sort of well be it illness or just anything really you think oh 
it‟s not going to happen to me (yeah). (Harry) 
 
Well what happened was it was literally like waiting for it to arrive… (Ben) 
 
People described this stage of waiting for what was virtual and relatively abstract to 
become the reality they had seen so long on TV and in the newspapers in the 
following way: 
  
[…] it doesn‟t come home to you until it gets close to your own doorstep. You 
know you see it on television and the pictures are horrendous and you try and 
visualise what people are going through but it still seems very remote from 
what you actually do on your own farm with your day to day running of your 
farm […] (Henry) 
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In emotional terms, this phase was described as other-worldly: “it was a weird time, 
really weird”, “it was a weird feeling”, “it was really weird, felt really weird”; and 
again: “you feel you just sort of on tenterhooks waiting for something to happen or 
not to happen, it‟s really weird feeling, really felt really weird” (Henry). The 
anticipation and suspense were contrasted with the „reality‟ to aid expression of just 
how bad this stage was: 
 
The anticipation of thinking well I might get it is worse if you‟ve got it you could 
just say well that‟s it, they‟ve got it, they‟ve been killed and it‟s over and it‟s 
finished isn‟t it. (Henry) 
 
[…] the suspense of not having foot and mouth and everybody else around you 
having it you know you would think well you‟re bound to get it, it‟s in your mind 
all the time (said three times) (Henry) 
 
It‟s sort of a bigger worry to you thinking well I might get it all the time than 
what it would be if you just said “Right well that‟s it they‟ve got it (mm) and it 
would just be over and finished wouldn‟t it? (Henry) 
 
The suspended reality of this stage was described in a number of instances by 
referring to relatively abstract cognitive processes, for example hoping that FMD 
would go away and not arrive: “so we thought may be we‟re going to be okay, may 
be luckily enough we, it won‟t come to us” (Ben). These were intrinsically linked to 
the reality of physical activities that were undertaken, namely disinfecting and 
locking oneself away. In this way the biosecurity measures become Foot and Mouth. 
The disease was not something occurring elsewhere for that had a sense of unreality; 
the reality was what was happening on the ground; it was embodied in the practical 
measures being taken.  
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Placing FMD 
A distinct next phase of the epidemic was constructed in terms of anxiety levels 
increasing when FMD had reached the county, but not yet the individual farm. The 
disease transforms from an abstract „other‟, to take on a clearer geographical 
dimension. As the disease is given cartographical shape and located geographically, 
expression is given to the desire to monitor and control its progress. This forms part 
of the personification of the disease as an enemy against which one had to fight, 
sometimes in a one-to-one battle. 
 In the following quote FMD and, metonymically, the premises it infected are 
conceptualised as prowling animals or ghosts, creeping slowly up on their prey or as 
a threatening force of nature, such as a thunderstorm (see Nerlich et al. 2002 for 
similar metaphors used by the media). 
 
[...] you‟d look on the Internet every night which was DEFRA‟s website was not 
bad actually, I know the communications on the whole were quite poor, that 
was reasonably up to date.  And every night, literally every night I‟d spend half 
an hour looking at the latest lot of infected premises (mm).  And er they just 
seemed to start coming, you know just creeping closer. […] And they were still 
sort of er grumbling on as I remember. And it just gradually rumbled and 
grumbled. (Ben) 
 
Luckily in March we bought a computer and that was on twenty four hours a 
day you know every time you went in you‟d look to see where the next one had 
popped up at. (Paul) 
 
Emotional intensity is conveyed in terms of intimate attachment. This was poignantly 
expressed by a vet who described keeping close watch on the spread as actually 
sitting on the means of information: “… sitting on the Internet really er looking at the 
latest cases and thinking crickey it‟s getting closer” (Ben). 
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 This „spatial modelling‟ of the disease spread went hand in hand with a 
personalisation of the response to the disease threat and of the strategies deployed 
to stop the spread of the disease. This response can be regarded as different from 
the „mathematical modelling‟ of the epidemic carried out by scientists, but it also 
shows some similarities.  The „lay‟ spatial modelling and the „expert‟ spatial modelling 
of the disease were means of taking „control‟ of the disease. However, for farmers 
this control was not matched by power (either political or computational) – it was 
more symbolic than real -, whereas in the case of the government, using 
mathematical models to aid decision making about the disease meant taking control 
and was matched by having power (on „situating risk‟, computer modelling and local 
experience, see Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004). In both cases biosecurity became 
part of „spatial practice‟; in one case biosecurity became part of an embodied and 
embedded spatial practice imbued with spatial symbolism (such as signs on gates); 
in the other it became part of a disembodied spatial practice imbued with power 
exerted from a distance (see Lefebvre 1991) and permeated with abstract symbolism 
(interactive maps, graphs, numbers etc.).  
 Just like the Cumbrian sheep farmers affected by the fallout from the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 (see Wynne 1996), the farmers, but also and 
perhaps even more so the vets, affected by FMD in 2001 came to see government 
scientists as unready to note variability in environmental conditions and data and as 
unwilling to work with the local expertise of the farmers and vets themselves (see 
Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004).  
 
[...] central control has taken over. But unfortunately it doesn‟t work you know 
you do need the local knowledge and that, that‟s one of the things that failed 
dismally I think, they didn‟t really make use of what local knowledge, the didn‟t 
use for instance the hunt slaughterers when they were desperate for 
slaughterers [...] (Pat) 
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Personalising biosecurity 
Reducing the risk of spreading the disease therefore became a personal matter and a 
matter of personal responsibility. It was not just a matter of science and certainly not 
only one of government policy. The threat of infection was framed in personal terms, 
as demonstrated by a vet summarising what many farmers thought: “so they literally 
thought Christ that‟s it, they‟re going to come and kill me tomorrow”. This 
metonymical use of the pronoun is very common in FMD discourse, where the 
personal pronouns - I (will be killed) or (FMD will kill) me - stand for the infected 
premise, which again stands for the infected herd, which again stands for the 
individual cow, pig or sheep that is actually killed. Under these circumstances, certain 
official policies, such as regular inspection by a vet, were again personalised. 
Creative thinking or coping replaced or supplemented regulation. To avoid direct 
contact between farmer and vet, a possible source of disease transmission, one 
farmer implemented the following strategy to minimise risk: 
 
I learnt him [the vet] how to ride a quad bike, showed him all the, once he got 
the lay of the land and he knew where all the farm was, told him where all the 
cows were and I used to say to him “Right you come when you want and then I 
don‟t have to meet you at the road end.” I says “You wash your car off, 
disinfect yourself, come down, get the bike, go round them all yourself,” I says 
“And then if you think there‟s owt badly come back and tell me.” (Pat) 
 
When another farmer heard the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 
DEFRA, Elliot Morley, visiting Penrith on 5th July, proclaim on the radio that farmers 
were perhaps „not doing enough‟ (see also Hetherington 2001), the account of how 
he reacted to this bit of news was more than an expression of its emotional impact. 
Recounting the tale provides an opportunity to contest government policy from 
personal experience: 
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[O]n July 5th I remember milking these cows […] I remember it was 6 o‟clock, 
the news, on the local radio […] and is it Elliot Morley was one of the 
agricultural ministers? And he came on and I can‟t remember the exact quote 
but when you‟re trying your hardest to keep this disease at bay and you‟re 
under such pressure it was exhausting, the pressure was exhausting it was 
awful, it was just, you were just tired out all the time and he came up on the 
radio and he, he said words to the effect of that farmers weren‟t doing their bit 
to try and control the disease.  And I was in such rage if he‟d walked in I think 
I‟d have killed him and I‟ve never felt like that in my life and I mean that, I 
think I‟d have killed him. […]  I know cows can feel, can sense when you‟re 
feeling angry or something and I er took all the clusters off the cows and let out 
what I was milking and I walked out.  I had to really, really calm down, I 
couldn‟t go on with my work feeling such rage towards him with that 
statement.  You‟d think feeling like that I‟d remember what he‟d said wouldn‟t 
you but I can‟t, like I said earlier I‟ve blocked a lot of it out. (Peter) 
 
For a dairy farmer to remove the clusters (group of four rubber-lined cases that 
attach to the cows teats to milk them) in the middle of milking is an unprecedented 
action and the marker of an extreme response - similar to a teacher suddenly 
walking out of a lesson in the middle of explaining something to children, leaving 
them confused and unattended and the lesson unfinished (Sue Wrennall, personal 
communication).   
 Enacted policies will inevitably have undergone translation to multiple 
personal experiences. Previous studies have shown that narratives constructed in 
response to collective events, such as FMD, impact on individuals lives in many ways 
and are subsequently imbued with multiple meanings (see for example Wengraf 
2000). For those who thought farmers were being victimised and that the 
government wanted to shift responsibility from the government onto the farmers, 
this translation made for an emotive point of resistance: “they kept adding more 
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rules and regulations and they classified us as a blue box, a very high risk area, 
that‟s when we were supposed to put disinfectant at road ends and so there was 
police cars up and down here two and three times a day, patrol cars” (Paul); “it was 
like having somebody sat on your shoulder” (Paul); “you feel like bloody criminals” 
(Paul). 
  
Rituals of FMD 
During the first and last phase of the process of dealing with FMD, keeping 
everything „spotless‟ was described as an obsession, integrated into very ritualised 
and personal coping patterns, as articulated in the fictional account quoted at the 
beginning of this article. “Only essential human excursions were made outside the 
farm space, presaged by a ritual of spraying vehicles and driving or walking through 
baths of disinfectant that became symbolic.” (Wrennall 2002) 
Under circumstances of stress and anxiety the use of disinfectant was 
sometimes described not only in terms of best scientific practice and as the best way 
to resist infection, but also as a symbol of warding off disease in a quasi-magical 
way. This is not surprising, as in many cases where uncertainties surround diseases, 
such as tuberculosis or more recently SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), 
reverting to well-known cleansing rituals has been identified as a way of reducing 
anxiety and feelings of helplessness (see Wallis and Nerlich, 2005). As the Chicago 
sociologist Julius Roth pointed out about half a century ago, uncertainty and 
ritualisation seem to go hand in hand when coping with contagious diseases, 
especially when the routes of transmission are unknown or uncertain, as they were in 
the case of FMD: 
 
Tuberculosis is a contagious disease. But just how contagious is it? In what 
ways and under what circumstances is it likely to be transmitted from one 
person to another? And what procedures are most effective for preventing 
transmission? The answers to these questions are quite uncertain and TB 
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specialists show considerable disagreement in the details of the manner in 
which they deal with these problems. These uncertainties leave the way open 
for ritualized procedures that often depend more on convenience and ease of 
administration than on rationally deduced probabilities. They also leave the way 
open for irrational practices that can properly be called “magic.” (Roth 1957: 
310)5 
 
The use of disinfectant became more than just best scientific practice; it took on an 
important ritualistic role to ward off the disease in just such a quasi-magical way 
(see also Douglas 1970).  
 
XY for example stopped using his car and started cycling everywhere because 
he perceived that the bicycle was less ((   )) disease transmission risk than 
driving the car (right).  YZ for example […]  he had like a big four wheel drive 
thing which he sold and swapped for like a crap little car er because he says 
“Oh it‟s just impossible to keep a Land Rover clean.” And literally this is how, 
how worried people were that you know they‟d cycle to [town] on the bike 
rather than going in the car, things like this (mm). (Ben) 
 
I used to go to the pub and all over on my push bike, wouldn‟t even bring the 
car. Looking back it seems silly what I did but you just, you did anything you 
could to keep it out. (Peter) 
 
In recall, scepticism of the effect of such measures is tempered by the power these 
actions have as expressions of „just how worried farmers were‟. Actions were 
defended by asserting that, at the very least, they provided comfort for the individual 
concerned.  
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We did have a big straw pad down in the yard that we disinfected every day 
hoping that would help but you sort of make yourself think it will work (yeah), 
a bit of wishful thinking, whether it works or not I don‟t know. (Paul) 
 
Actions were evaluated in terms of the „off-chance‟ that they help, rather than in 
terms of evidence offered by scientific method. Actions across the board by different 
actors had such characteristics, from pre-emptive closure of footpaths by individual 
farmers or directed by central government to disinfectant pads laid out across 
highways by individuals or by councils.  
Visible biosecurity measures, such as putting down disinfectant mats and 
putting up „keep out‟ signs were described in a number of instances as physical 
evidence of efforts to deflect blame. The demarcation of boundaries was offered as 
evidence of “doing one‟s bit”, but it might also have been conceived as a magical 
„cordon sanitaire‟ (see Murcott 1993: 131). It had both physical/material as well 
conceptual/symbolic functions. As Wrennall has pointed out: 
 
Throughout the FMD outbreak signs were fixed at this point and mats drenched 
with disinfectant were maintained across every farm gateway in the region […]. 
The „farm gate‟ was thus further imbued with meaning, becoming a conceptual 
barrier to the disease. (Wrennall 2002) 
 
Conversely, questioning of the measures taken led to self-evaluation by farmers in 
terms of reducing guilt – “how could we live with ourselves if we had done nothing 
and caught it”; “you know and this guilt was going on in your mind forever and ever 
and ever”. Being physically active kept the mental demons at bay, just as much as, 
hopefully, FMD: 
 
You‟ve done everything that you can do but you think well if it comes on the air 
it‟s a waste of time or whatever I‟ve done I‟ve ((   )) I suppose it‟s just peace of 
 24 
mind isn‟t it? You‟ve done everything that you physically can do so as you can 
say well if it comes now I‟ve done all I can do… (Henry) 
 
Yeah well you had to do something don‟t you because if it didn‟t, it had 
happened and you hadn‟t done it you‟d have felt terrible. (Paul) 
 
And I actually went to [town], got myself a whole load of carpet and I nailed it 
to the public road [...] with a nail gun. And I went personally and disinfected it 
three times a day for six months.  I never went out, my wife thought it was 
very strange but we never went out.  And the day I put the mat on the road 
who should turn up but the police saying “What are you doing Mr G?” I said 
“Well what‟s it look like I‟m doing?”  “Oh well take it down,” I said “Well you 
take it down, I‟ll put it straight back down. Lock me up if you want but it will 
still be there because you pratts aren‟t prepared to do anything.”  […]  (Harry) 
 
In the last quote, stories of individual (heroic) actions carried out to control the 
disease are expressed in terms of criticism of authority. Biosecurity measures are 
appropriated as measures of resistance against authority whose perceived inaction 
was contested and whose inability to control the disease was ridiculed. 
 Personalising and ritualising biosecurity measures was however not only 
peculiar to farmers. In attacking an occupational group for not trying hard enough to 
keep the disease out, personalising biosecurity was also being carried out by the 
government. In its most punitive phase (in our case in the so-called „blue-box‟ 
zones), washing-out routines imposed by government inspectors came to resemble 
those of punishment rituals in prisons.  
  
Security of FMD 
Once FMD reached their farm, those participants in the interviews whose herd was 
infected described their experience in terms of an improvement in emotional state, 
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although there were obviously a great deal of individual differences at the time. The 
stress of waiting contrasted with the certainty of slaughter. The slaughter was, in 
some respect, a relief from worrying about risk, as action borne out of certainty 
overtook reflection about risk and uncertainty. 
 
It actually made, when it arrived eventually you know what it made it, not to 
say easier but at last it took kind of the, the uncertainty away because you 
knew what you were dealing with. (Ben) 
 
At the time I actually felt much more sorry for the people who were very close 
to us who didn‟t get it and who didn‟t get knocked out because they couldn‟t do 
anything and their stress levels, I mean once we‟d got it was almost, well it 
came on the Thursday a mile and a half away and I thought well this is, this is 
bad news you know.  But it, then my cousin got it next door and then I got it 
on about the same day.  So if it was going to come you know that close it was 
almost a relief to sort of ((    )) crisis, ((    )).  I felt much more sorry for those 
people who had to struggle on. (Harry)   
 
Some participants told us about the slaughter process in relative dispassionate 
terms:  
 
So we had one slaughter gangs working on the pigs, one slaughter gang 
working on the sheep and one slaughter gang working on the cattle. […] the 
slaughter thing went pretty smooth […] We had no hassle. (John, Nancy and 
David) 
 
Others were emotionally still very affected by the cull. One participant, for example, 
told the interviewer that a year ago, that is, in 2003, two years after the outbreak, 
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the interview would still have been “too upsetting” and that he was still haunted by 
images of the “killing field” (Peter).  
 If some found relative security, or at least certainty, in the slaughter then this 
was absent in descriptions of the clean-up operation that followed the slaughter. 
When the enemy had actually breached all barriers and the farm was infected, 
farmers who had done everything in their power to keep FMD at bay were infuriated 
by the way that the virus might be spread through various activities that were 
beyond their control: the transport of infected carcasses and the erratic movements 
taken by some army vehicles, for example. 
 
But we were told that the slaughter men had been using that, that Inn that was 
next to our cattle and we were therefore concerned that something had come 
on their tracks and that we‟d taken it into the field with the tracks. We couldn‟t 
really see why otherwise it should be that field (right) [which was infected]. 
(John, Nancy and David) 
 
And the wagons [removing slaughtered animal carcasses] you couldn‟t believe 
why the wagons were coming up past farms with no infection when they 
could‟ve easy accessed from the infected end. (Peter) 
 
I rigged up a pressure hose and we washed every wheel, there was not a spot 
of anything on anything and off it went [wagon full of corn salvaged after the 
slaughter]. And then damn it all the Army came past, never even stopped, and 
where they‟d come from inland, I don‟t know to this day where they‟d appeared 
from (right) zooming past, they never even stopped. I thought well here we 
are, doing all this, trying to stop the damn disease and off they go sort of thing 
covered in mud, I couldn‟t believe it. (Peter) 
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Incidents like this, and the suspension of post-infection cleaning operations to review 
costs, added to the general feeling of miscommunication, misinformation, 
misunderstanding and disempowerment that seems to have characterised many of 
the policies used to eradicate FMD (see Donaldson, Lowe and Ward 2002). Farmers 
also reported that the management of the clean-up operation, as well as the advice 
they received about how and what to clean after the slaughter, was very 
inconsistent. In the following quote we therefore find a rather rare but derogatory 
use of the term „risk assessment‟: 
 
But as the work, they sent those out to carry out this operation of disinfecting 
everything and at the same time there was a health and safety man came out 
to do a risk assessment (right) which should‟ve been done before these people 
came on.  So these people were on at the same time as he was on (right) and 
he was doing the risk assessment to write a report as to what should be looked 
at and what shouldn‟t be looked at by the cleansing ((   )) these people that 
were coming but they were all here at the same time (right) so there wasn‟t 
any great co-ordination between anybody. (John, Nancy and David) 
 
In another extract from the same interview one of the participants also questioned 
the science behind the biosecurity advice they were given – again stressing how 
inconsistent it was. 
 
John 
Oh yeah they‟ve backtracked on a lot of the things that they obviously were 
finding either better information really as they went on, they were hitting the 
sledgehammer with what they thought initially that it was initially, but it wasn‟t 
initially because well some of the farms and that in Cumbria they were taken 
apart weren‟t they? [whole buildings were destroyed during the clean-up that 
followed the slaughter] 
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[…] 
David 
I think at the end they said you know if you just pour boiling water over it it 
was quite sufficient. 
John 
All the fence posts and things, we didn‟t disinfect the fence posts where the 
stock had actually been but you had to disinfect the buildings 
Nancy 
Where they hadn‟t been. 
David 
Where they hadn‟t been yeah. 
John 
But I suppose the fence post was in sunlight to give it its due (right) so in 
theory it would be dry and the virus wouldn‟t, they said it wouldn‟t survive 
would it but 
David  
No, no 
 
Another participant raised similar issues about the uncertainties and contradictions 
surrounding (scientific) biosecurity advice and the management of the cleaning 
process (see also BBC News 2001a). 
 
There was research going on because I think to start with they were working 
with an unknown quantity, they didn‟t know how long the disease would survive 
and then they‟d, I forget the figures, I had them written down because it was 
intriguing when it did come out I think they told us that it was after 3, 4 days I 
think it would be dead outside anyway in the sunlight, as long as it‟s direct 
sunlight and not trapped up in muck, that sort of thing (right okay).  Inside it 
was some time later, I‟m making these figures up, it was something like weeks 
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and even if it was underground in the wet, in, concealed in muck it would only 
last I don‟t know a month or two. It wasn‟t long you know and this was, it 
must‟ve been October, November time [when they were allowed to clean up 
after the slaughter] and we got it in July, so in other words technically speaking 
the disease was dead but we still had to go through it all and get it absolutely 
spotless. […]  As soon as Christmas was approaching suddenly the standards 
dropped dramatically just to get finished so everybody could go home for 
Christmas [laughs] you know there was a lot of that went on, it was a bit of a 
nonsense.  But you know you thought well the disease is supposed to be dead 
anyway.  And everything absolutely spotless, we‟re finished, you‟re signed off - 
brilliant. (Peter) 
 
Conclusion 
Farmers talked about biosecurity measures in ways other than just reducing risk; 
they became a focus for the construction of coping strategies and attempts to lay 
blame and to resist blame. There was a lot of pressure (in terms of political rhetoric 
and enforcement by government, as well as social pressure from others, including 
farmers) to implement biosecurity measures. One farmer recalled that his brother, 
an arable farmer, was chastised by neighbours for not having a biosecurity mat at 
the entrance to his farm. Visible, physical biosecurity actions became ways to deflect 
blame and were self-evaluated by farmers as reducing guilt in terms of „how could 
we live with ourselves if we had done nothing and caught it‟; “you know and this guilt 
was going on in your mind forever and ever and ever” (Peter). The majority 
implemented what became known as biosecurity measures because (a) they were 
forced to and (b) they wanted and needed to feel they were doing something to help 
them cope. In this context biosecurity measures were cast as a symbol that things 
got 'out of control' rather than being regarded as ways that helped 'gain control'. 
Sensitivity to this framing is required, if concerned agencies are to encourage 
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farmers to adopt best practice. Policy makers need to work hard to understand the 
politics of the situation, for biosecurity has essentially become politicised. 
Personalisation and ritualisation of biosecurity measures afforded people 
caught up in the crisis a way of exerting some form of personal control over the 
disease and provided an occasion for the assertion of, at least symbolic, powers of 
agency. Paradoxically, such control measures (including visible symbols of these 
measures, such as keep out signs and disinfectant mats) became, in many ways, the 
FMD crisis  (just as much as the burning pyres became the FMD crisis for the non-
farming public watching the spread and control of FMD on TV and in the 
newspapers). Local actions taken by farmers gave physical expression to a narrative 
that the centrally organised measures for „controlling‟ the disease from a distance 
were not working and that these individual actions were the last line of defence 
against the enemy that they saw creeping up on its prey. 
This suggests potential difficulties for the promotion of practices to improve 
animal health: (a) a focus on the visible runs the risk of reawakening memories of 
FMD and of provoking resistance, and (b) the visible should not be promoted at the 
expense of the invisible, for example buying stock from known sources (The Royal 
Society 2002). The challenge is to embed in everyday practices and in responses to 
extreme events such as epidemics, actions that are both meaningful in terms of the 
science of controlling disease, and which recognise narratives of coping constructed 
during the last outbreak.   
The interviews we carried out in North Yorkshire demonstrate quite clearly 
that scientific theory and practice did not cohere, something that was also evident in 
other parts of the UK which were severely affected by FMD, such as Cumbria. As 
shown in a large scale empirical study carried out by Maggie Mort and her colleagues 
(see Mort et al., 2005), disinfectant mats and soaked barriers were immediately 
placed at farm entrances because that was the one thing to hand which local people 
could immediately do, whilst awaiting further news. Some also used household 
products, such as bicarbonate of soda, before „official‟ disinfectant became available. 
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Knowledge about such measures had survived from the 1967 outbreak of FMD and 
was quickly reactivated. However, it later became apparent that the science of (the 
new) „biosecurity‟ was hugely problematic and that its advocates had little 
understanding about conditions on the ground. This echoes the situation in which the 
Cumbrian sheep farmers found themselves after the Chernobyl accident, studied by 
Brian Wynne (Wynne 1996). The clash between the disinfectant practices and the 
biosecurity theory or between the lay response and the expert response during the 
FMD outbreak might have contributed to the emotional and sometimes obsessive 
ways in which biosecurity measures were carried out, not only by individual farmers 
but also by local authorities and government agencies. 
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1
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/footandmouth/flash/0,7365,443772,00.html for one of 
the many animated maps of the disease spread. 
2
 This was illustrated in stories told to Nick Wright during an interview conducted with 
regional helpline operator and Trading Standards Officer. 
3
 As David Curry, MP for Skipton and Ripon, told the House of Commons on 21 June 
2001: “When the rest of the country believed that things were over—indeed, the 
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government were telling us that the disease was under control and all the graphs happily 
pointed to it petering out on or about 7 June [date of the general election]—we had a 
virulent, violent and destructive outbreak that consumed all other activity […] Not merely 
did the world not know about the outbreak, it did not want to know about it.” (Curry, 
2001) 
4
 “By the end of July, when a large outbreak centred on Thirsk in North Yorkshire began 
to cause concern, FMD was present only in geographically isolated pockets and more 
resources were available. As a result a new policy tool was introduced. The „restricted 
infected area‟ was also known as a „blue box‟ because of the coloured ink used to 
demarcate its boundaries on a map.  […] Any vehicle visiting a farm premises within the 
blue box required a license in advance. DEFRA officers supervised over 4500 such visits. 
Vehicles entering and leaving the area were disinfected at roadblock disinfectant stations 
utilising high-pressure hoses rather than drive-over matting. […] During the existence of 
the blue box, the patrols carried out 5000 spot-checks on vehicles to determine if the 
drivers were following biosecurity regulations.” (Donaldson and Wood, 2004: 383) 
5
 We would like to thank Anne Murcott for alerting us to this article. 
